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Article
Binding the United Nations: Compulsory Review of
Disputes Involving UN International Responsibility
before the International Court of Justice
Anastasia Telesetsky*
ABSTRACT
One of the gaps in the International Law Commission’s Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations is a
discussion of mechanisms for judicially reviewing the possibility of
international responsibility of international organizations such as the
United Nations (UN). This article explores the judicial mechanisms that
exist to review actions or omissions that might implicate international
legal responsibility of the UN and its specialized agencies. The analysis
that follows explores two options under the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) Statute for enhancing UN judicial accountability: (1) amending
Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, and (2) providing for an international
agreement requiring the UN to submit disputes implicating responsibility
to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Since States would be unlikely to
agree to amend Article 34 because of existing controversies over UN
reform, this option is ultimately discounted. The article concludes that
States should instead enlarge the ICJ’s practice of issuing advisory
opinions that “bind” parties to guarantee that the doctrine of international
organization responsibility is coherently applied to the UN.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations (UN) has
recently tarnished its record in Haiti. In April 2004, after President
Aristide’s departure from Haiti, the United Nations Stabilization Mission
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in Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived as a peacekeeping force.1 While
conducting missions within neighborhoods to target rebel leaders, the UN
peacekeeping forces were accused of killing civilian bystanders,2
including children.3 There has been no formal judicial review regarding
the UN’s decision of whether to provide compensation to the families of
the victims or to the State of Haiti for the actions of the UN affiliated
peacekeepers.
More recently, the UN in Haiti has been accused of being a vector
for cholera after the organization deployed a unit of Nepalese
peacekeepers to Haiti without testing all individuals in the unit for
cholera.4 At least one epidemiologist has suggested that the specific
cholera outbreak that killed 2000 and hospitalized 100,000 others was
probably imported.5 As with the civilians caught in the crossfire of the
peacekeepers, there has been no judicial review of the UN’s actions.
Rather, the UN will analyze internally whether it proceeded with due
care in its humanitarian deployment and it will decide unilaterally
whether it will compensate victims for their losses.
In the wake of these two incidents involving peacekeepers operating
under the control of the UN, a question of UN responsibility arises: Does
the State of Haiti, on behalf of its citizens, have a cause of action against
the UN for violating basic international human rights law? After all, the
UN may have been responsible for depriving life to civilians by
exacerbating existing dangerous conditions and creating unnecessary
risk. If we accept the principle that international subjects that have rights
should also have responsibilities, Haiti may have an actionable claim
against the UN for breaching customary international legal obligations to
protect the fundamental human rights of civilians.
This raises a number of fascinating international legal questions. If
Haiti were to attempt to bring a case within its own courts, would the UN
be protected from domestic prosecution by claims of absolute privileges
and immunities? Could the UN even be prosecuted for violating
fundamental international rights when the constitutive documents of the
1. See Restoring a Secure and Stable Environment, UNITED NATIONS
STABILIZATION
MISSION
IN
HAITI,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
2. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, ¶¶ 11–15, U.N. Doc. S/2006/1003 (Dec. 19, 2006).
3. See Sandra Jordan, World: Haiti Deaths Blamed on UN Troops: Mourning
Parents Accuse Peacekeepers of 'Collateral' Deaths in Battle to Rid Slums of Gangs, THE
OBSERVER, Apr. 1, 2007, at 36, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 1248229141 (referencing
a man claiming his son was killed by the peacekeepers from the UN Stabilization Mission
in Haiti).
4. See Haiti Cholera Outbreak: Nepal Troops Not Tested, BRIT. BROADCASTING
CORP. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11949181.
5. See id.
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organization provide no explicit language assigning responsibility to the
UN to protect these rights?6 Because the UN is not a State, this paper will
not directly address whether the UN has obligations under international
treaty law, but will instead start its analysis from the assumption that the
UN, like other international legal actors, can be held responsible and
accountable for breaches of international law. Assuming that the UN
should be held legally responsible for breaches of customary
international law, one is left to wonder, practically speaking, how Haiti
might be able to bring an international legal claim against the UN.
What are Haiti’s options for seeking a binding judicial review?
Under the current international legal framework, Haiti’s options are
limited. For example, it could potentially bring a judicial action against
the UN agencies responsible for deploying the peacekeeping forces
seeking damages in its own court system.7 The UN, however, would
likely invoke privileges and immunities available under both the UN
Charter and the two conventions on privileges and immunities. Using a
different tactic, Haiti could entreat the UN Secretary-General to pay
reparations to its damaged citizens as ex gratia payments.8 Finally, Haiti
could appeal to the good conscience of the Member States of the UN
agency to see that its citizens have some remedy supplied by the UN.9
However, none of these options has the certainty of systematized judicial
review, and all of them have the potential for widely varying recoveries
under disparate remedy theories.
PROPOSED ARGUMENT
This paper begins with the premise that every UN Member State is
entitled to neutral legal review of UN actions by a court of law. This is
needed because the existing internal review by UN administrators alone
will not suffice.10 Given a State’s uncertain options for formally seeking
6. UN responsibility is not mentioned in the UN Charter. Rather, the UN is
expected to help “achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. This language makes historical
sense. The UN was considered post-World War II to be collaborative club of nations. The
current powerful reach of the UN, as a policymaker and deliverer of public goods (e.g.
security, development services), was not envisioned in 1945.
7. See generally August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International
Organizations, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 131 (2001) (referring to recurring problems in
addressing UN accountability and lack of certainty about where to bring cases identifying
potential UN responsibility under international law).
8. See generally id. (referring to the recurring problems in addressing UN
accountability and the lack of certainty about where to bring cases identifying potential
UN responsibility under international law).
9. Id.
10. For the purposes of this paper, the term “UN” is used to encompass all UN
institutions including all organizations, agencies, and missions that derive authority under
the UN Charter or the constitutive documents for UN specialized agencies.
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UN liability, this paper argues that a mechanism is needed for resolving
international legal disputes between Member States and the UN. Due to
the fifty plus years of inertia in attempting to amend Article 34 of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute11 to include international
organizations within the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction, this article argues
for a less obvious but equally viable approach to binding the UN. This
would be an agreement that would require the ICJ to issue a “binding
advisory opinion” for all cases involving an unsettled controversy
between a State and the UN concerning UN responsibility.
This article’s analysis begins with an overview of the International
Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations as a codification of UN legal responsibility. This overview
examines the existing challenges of practically assessing UN
responsibility and liability. The second part of the paper explores two
proposals that would provide meaningful judicial review of UN
responsibility and liability: 1) reviving historical efforts to amend Article
34 of the ICJ Statute to give the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over
contentious matters involving the UN as a party, and 2) expanding the
realm of ICJ “binding advisory opinions” through a treaty designed to
provide a legal mechanism to ensure UN accountability. While both
proposals would result in the ability of the ICJ to issue binding opinions
in cases where the UN is a party, the paper concludes that a draft treaty,
rather than an amendment, is politically more viable because it would not
trigger the expansive amendment process of the ICJ Statute. This paper
argues for the need to ensure that the ICJ, as the principal judicial organ
of the UN, has the functional capacity to review UN actions and make
public findings on responsibility and liability.
In order for this proposal to be effectuated, States must identify a
mutually agreeable and reliable judicial review mechanism. This
mechanism is absent in our current international legal system. As Geoff
Gilbert suggests in his work on the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), the UN is largely judgment-proof.12 Gilbert uses the
example of repatriated refugees who were brutally persecuted on their
return to their home country after the UNHCR ordered the closure of a
refugee camp.13 Reflecting on the options of the refugees to seek justice,
he observes that “[t]here is no obvious mechanism by which UNHCR
might be held accountable . . . .”14 As such, the refugees have no means
for legal recourse. This paper argues for the formulation of an “obvious
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
12. See Geoff Gilbert, Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities:
UNHCR and the New World Order, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 349, 380–81 (1998).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 382.
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mechanism” to address potential grievances, using approaches that are
already available under the ICJ statute.
II. DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: SETTING THE STAGE FOR
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
A number of influential players in international law have questioned
the lack of legal redressability where UN actions are concerned. For
example, in 2009 the International Law Commission (ILC) finished its
draft of 66 articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations,
and requested that States and international organizations submit their
comments to the UN Secretary-General.15 In many ways, the ILC draft
articles were a continuation of the previous ILC project on the
responsibility of the States. However, the ILC draft articles are
distinguishable from the previous project because they extend legal
responsibility to a broad number of new actors. These are defined in the
articles as “international organizations.”16 This new category of actors
includes the UN Secretary-General, the World Trade Organization, and
the World Bank.17 Notably, within its adopted articles, the drafters did
not define the relationship between responsibility and accountability.
They also did not attempt to articulate precisely how responsibility, for a
body such as the UN, would translate into accountability. The connection
is left ambiguous, although we learn from the commentary that the
“articles only take the perspective of international law and consider
whether an international organization is responsible under that law. Thus,
issues of responsibility or liability under municipal law are not as such
covered by the draft articles.”18 The ILC draft articles identify no
international judicial mechanisms for reviewing responsibility against the
UN for alleged violations of public international law, nor do they
acknowledge that under the current legal framework, the UN is largely
judgment-proof.
While there is legitimate concern that the application of the ILC
draft articles to any international organization may be too broad to be a
useful legal tool, the articles in their current form still offer an
unprecedented opportunity for States to register their legal concerns
15. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 4–June 6, July 6–Aug. 7, 2009, ¶
14, U.N. Doc. A/64/10; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2009) [hereinafter ILC 2009
Report].
16. See id. (referencing the new actors in the International Law Commission project
as “international organizations”).
17. See id. (mentioning three of the “international organizations” in the International
Law Commission as the UN Secretary-General, the World Trade Organization, and the
World Bank).
18. Id. ¶ 51, art. 1, cmt. 3.
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regarding assigning responsibility to the UN for violations of
international law. A proliferation of UN-sponsored activities within
States, such as deployments of peacekeeping missions, delivery of
infrastructure loans from international economic institutions,
implementation of economic sanctions, and provision of disaster relief,
raise issues about what responsibilities exist when the UN exercises its
powers as an international organization in the context of international
law.19 Article 4 of the ILC’s draft articles suggest that international
organizations should be held responsible for wrongs where actions can be
attributed to the organization under international law and the action
constitutes a breach of international law.20 Exactly how can the UN be
held responsible for these alleged breaches? Which international actor or
actors should decide whether an action can be attributed to the UN and
whether the action amounts to a breach? The draft articles are silent on
this point.
While there are references in the articles to an international
organization having an obligation to provide reparation, compensation,
or satisfaction in the case of a wrongful act,21 the text of the articles is not
complete. What is missing from the current articles is a vehicle for
applying the draft articles to actual legal scenarios involving the UN.
Such vehicles could include the coordinator of international disaster
services, the command body behind a peacekeeping mission, or the
purveyor of development aid. Article 39 of the draft articles provides that
“[t]he members of a responsible international organization are required to
take, in accordance with the rules of the organization, all appropriate
measures in order to provide the organization with the means for
effectively fulfilling its obligations under this chapter.”22 Yet, no mention
is made as to whether members of an international organization need to
provide judicial review of the organization’s decision regarding whether
to provide compensation for a wrongful act.
This article argues that the UN should be subject to formal judicial
review for matters that implicate the rights of States under public
international law. The General Assembly and the Security Council are
inappropriate for reviewing such UN actions since they are largely
political institutions rather than expert judicial bodies. Municipal courts
cannot review issues of UN organization responsibility unless the UN
waives its immunity from lawsuits as provided for under the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.23 Therefore,
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. (referencing several activities that the UN sponsors within States).
See id. ¶ 51, art. 4.
See ILC 2009 Report, supra note 15, ¶ 51, arts. 34–36.
See id. ¶ 51, art. 39.
See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13,
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there exists only one body, the ICJ, which is currently well-positioned to
judicially review UN compliance with public international law.
If the ILC draft articles are to have immediate applicability to the
UN, what is needed is an explicit linkage in the text between the
principles of responsibility and mechanisms of responsibility. The
content of the draft articles already provides guidance to the ICJ in
understanding attribution of actions to the UN. In order to access the
ICJ’s binding jurisdiction, States need a legal mechanism that will
address existing gaps between the practice of international law in the 21st
century and the content of the 1945 ICJ statute. In 1945, international
organizations did not play nearly as pivotal a role in international
processes as they do today. As will be suggested in Part III below, a
mechanism for addressing UN responsibility can be provided either
through a revival of the efforts to amend Article 34 of the ICJ statute, or
by obtaining a supplementary agreement by UN Member States. This
supplemental agreement would respond to the UN’s obligation, under
Article 39 of the ILC draft articles, to provide some neutral judicial
review mechanism to publicly adjudicate the international responsibility
and liability of UN agencies. The remainder of Part II will discuss
existing barriers to judicial review of UN responsibility and liability.
A. CURRENT OBSTACLES IN HOLDING THE UN RESPONSIBLE
The UN has the potential to commit numerous violations of
fundamental rights, including the unlawful destruction or confiscation of
civilian property, the violation of due process rights, and the unlawful
application of economic sanctions to injure vulnerable groups.24 If States
attempt to hold the UN responsible and demand compensation, reparation
or satisfaction on behalf of their citizens, they may find themselves
blocked by treaties such as the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations that largely shield the UN from
domestic or international judicial review.25 The practice of “absolute
immunity” resulting in discretionary justice has interfered with efforts to
hold the UN publicly responsible for violations of either national or
international law.
B. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Since the UN Charter was drafted at a time when it was uncertain
whether the UN would be able to provide any effective international
governance, the drafters were highly protective of its infant institutions.
As a result, Article 105(1) of the Charter provides that the UN shall enjoy
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention].
24. See Reinisch, supra note 7, at 132.
25. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23.
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in the territory of each of its Members those privileges and immunities
that are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.26 Article II(2) of the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
and Article III(4) of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies27 both reflect the post-war
sentiment that the UN needed robust immunities to separate its
institutions from any national judicial review.
The problem was that no one contemplated in the UN’s early history
that the responsibility of the UN might be the appropriate subject of
formal adjudicatory review. When the 1949 “Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations” advisory opinion
articulated the evolution of the UN into an institution endowed with
international legal personality,28 no one envisioned that the UN itself
might engage in behavior that violated international legal standards.
Subsequent judicial review of UN actions by the ICJ has been limited to
advisory opinions requested by UN agencies who may have been
concerned about future relationships with a State.29 For example, in
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and
Egypt, the World Health Organization (WHO) requested that the ICJ
review the legality of the process the WHO was proposing to use to
transfer regional offices from Egypt to Jordan.30 The ICJ’s advisory
opinion did not bind the parties since Egypt was not involved in the
proceedings.31 While the WHO unilaterally decided to bring the request
for an advisory opinion in this matter, there is no guarantee that other UN
institutions will request opinions in matters that potentially implicate
responsibility of an international organization.
While judges have generally criticized the idea of absolute
immunity as an “anachronistic doctrine incompatible with the demands

26. See U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1.
27. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
art. III, § 4, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities of the
UN] (“The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far
as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however,
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.”);
Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23.
28. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries].
29. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 67 (June 6).
30. See id.
31. See generally Pieter H.F. Bekker, The UN General Assembly Requests a World
Court Advisory Opinion on Israel’s Separation Barrier, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Dec.
2003), http://www.asil.org/insigh121.cfm (stating that under the ICJ Statute, advisory
opinions rendered by the Court are non-binding).
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of justice and the rule of law,”32 such immunity persists in practice since
municipal courts continue to refuse to find that the UN has waived its
immunities.33 In fact, the UN has invoked its absolute immunity even
when doing so may injure a third party. For example, in Shamsee v.
Shamsee,34 the New York appellate court dismissed a sequestration order
from an estranged wife because the order was directed at the UN as the
employer of her former husband. Previously, the New York Court
Special Term35 had granted the plaintiff a sequestration order requiring
the UN to pay her spousal support payment from his pension benefits.36
On principle, the UN refused to comply and requested the U.S.
Department of State to “issue a suggestion of immunity from legal
process . . . to the appropriate officials of the Queens County Court.”37
The legally entrenched reality of absolute immunity has led to the
unsatisfactory judicial result of ad hoc discretionary justice, described in
the next sub-section, rather than through processes of external justice.
The pervasiveness of absolute jurisdictional immunity is illustrated
well by the ongoing dispute in the Netherlands involving the Mothers of
Srebrenica. There, a group of families who lost 6,000 family members in
the Srebrenica Massacre of Bosniak men and boys, filed a civil law suit
against the Netherlands and the UN because of an alleged failure to act
effectively to protect civilians in a region that had been declared a safe
area by the UN.38 The UN never made an appearance in the court case or
issued any statement. Even in light of the UN’s absence, the Dutch court
still ruled on immunity and found that Article 105 of the UN Charter, in
conjunction with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, ensured that the UN enjoys immunity from legal
process.39 The Dutch court found no indication that the UN had waived
32. McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 55 (Loucaides, J., dissenting).
33. For example, in the United States, courts have found that the UN has complete
immunity unless the immunity has been waived. See, e.g., Van Aggelen v. United Nations,
311 F. App’x. 407 (2d Cir. 2009); Emmanuel v. United States, 253 F.3d 755 (1st Cir.
2001); Bisson v. United Nations, No. 06 Civ. 6352(PAC)(AJP), 2008 WL 375094
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2008).
34. Shamsee v. Shamsee, 428 N.Y.S.2d 33 (App. Div. 1980).
35. “Special term” refers to a practice in some court systems of assigning specific
types of cases to a particular part of the court. See Glossary of Legal Terms, NEW YORK
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nycourts.gov/ lawlibraries/glossary.shtml.
36. See Shamsee, 428 N.Y.S.2d 33.
37. Letter to the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations, 1978
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 186, U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.1.
38. See Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The State
of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD67
96&u_ljn=BD6796.
39. U.N. Charter art. 105, para. 1. (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of

84

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 21:1

this immunity.40 As a result, the Dutch District Court found that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the civil case.41 In 2010, the appellate court agreed
with the District Court’s conclusion, adding a concern that anything less
than absolute immunity could lead to excessive litigation which would
jeopardize the ability of the UN to function in maintaining peace and
security.42 Attorneys for the Plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the
Dutch Supreme Court and are arguing that the UN may not prove
judgment-proof if it does not provide some international legal settlement
mechanism for claimants.43 In September 2010, the Dutch public
prosecutor agreed to open a criminal investigation of the peacekeeping
mission.44 However, because of the UN’s absolute immunity against
prosecution, the plaintiffs remain unable to access any judicial forum
which will hear its claims of violations of international law by the UN.45
Relying on the UN to waive its jurisdictional immunity before
submitting to either domestic or international judicial review undermines
the legitimacy of public international law as the body of law that has
been evolving to manage all public international relationships. Even
though the UN is the flagship international institution, it continues to
have the capacity to operate at the periphery of international law as a
result of both its immunity under domestic law and the anachronistic
nature of the ICJ statute. Under Article 65 of the ICJ statute, the UN
bodies are empowered to “request” an advisory opinion but are not
required to seek opinions even if there is a live dispute between a State

its purposes.”); Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. II § 2 ("The
United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar
as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”).
40. See Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The State
of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD67
96&u_ljn=BD6796.
41. See id.
42. See Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of Srebrenica/The
State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf.
43. Rachel Irwin, UN Ruled Immune From Srebrenica Prosecution, INSTITUTE FOR
WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (Apr. 3, 2010), http://iwpr.net/report-news/un-ruledimmune-srebrenica-prosecution (observing that at the end of their appellate decision, the
Dutch judges “say they ‘regret’ that the UN ‘has not instigated an alternate course of
proceedings’ as they were required to do when the organisation was created in 1946, as a
condition of immunity.”).
44. Rachel Irwin, Dutch UN Troops Face Srebrenica Probe, CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
(Sept.
8,
2010),
http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2010/9/8/dutch-un-troops-face-srebrenicaprobe.html.
45. Id.
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and a UN institution over an international legal issue.46 In lieu of an
adjudicative process articulating authoritative legal rulings on matters of
international organization, responsibility, and liability, the UN relies
primarily on resolving disputes involving UN Member States through
diplomatic channels which lack the public transparency associated with
“good governance” and general practices of rule of law.47
C. AD HOC DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
Despite having absolute immunity, the UN has privately
acknowledged some responsibility for injuring innocent parties by
offering compensation to certain injured parties. For example, as a result
of certain UN Operations in the Republic of the Congo, the UN agreed in
negotiations with Belgium not to “evade responsibility where it was
established that the United Nations agents had in fact caused unjustifiable
damage to innocent parties.”48
46. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65 (“The Court may give an advisory opinion on
any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”).
47. See, e.g,. Servet Yanatma, UN Delays Release of Flotilla Report at Israel's
Request, TODAY’S ZAMAN (July 25, 2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-251578un-delays-release-of-flotilla-report-at-israels-request.html (delaying the UN report to allow
Turkey and Israel to continue their diplomatic reconciliation). See generally Francis N.
Botchway, Good Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle, and the Elements, 13 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 159, 160–62 (2001) (discussing transparency in relation to good governance
and rule of law). Discussions within diplomatic channels are private, so it is difficult to
report on how diplomats arrived at their decision. However, in some instances public
discussions of responsibility have become subsumed into ongoing private discussions
resulting in action through the General Assembly. For example, high profile survivors of
the 1994 Rwandan genocide prepared a suit against the UN for the UN’s complicity during
the genocide which resulted in the survivors’ spouses’ deaths. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND
RWANDA 399–401 (2001); Karen MacGregor, Survivors Sue UN for 'Complicity' in
Rwanda Genocide, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 11, 2000, at 16, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/survivors-sue-un-for-complicity-inrwanda-genocide-727146.html. While the lawsuits have been dropped and the UN has not
accepted any responsibility, see NEUFFER, supra, at 400–01 (“The United Nations legal
staff . . . has denied all liability . . . [and the parties] parted company with their legal team .
. . .”), the lawsuits helped spur public interest that led to an independent inquiry into the
UN’s actions in Rwanda commissioned by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Id. at 400.
Partly because of this independent inquiry’s report, the UN then created assistance
programs for survivors of the Rawandan genocide. See, e.g., Assistance to Survivors of the
1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Particularly Orphans, Widows and Victims of Sexual
Violence, G.A. Res. 60/225, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/225 (Mar. 22, 2006).
48. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and
Belgium Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the
Congo by Belgian Nationals, U.N.-Belg., Feb. 20, 1965, 535 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter
UN-Belgium Settlement]; The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies
and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and
Immunities: Study Prepared by the Secretariat, [1967] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 219, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.1 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Study]
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Early after its establishment, the UN also acknowledged liability for
damage caused by the UN Emergency Force,49 the UN’s first
internationally organized emergency peacekeeping force.50 In 2004, the
UN Secretariat agreed that the UN must pay compensatory liability
where “an act of a peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the
Organization, and . . . committed in violation of an international
obligation.”51 Yet paying compensation in private is not the same as
publicly admitting a legal obligation.
More broadly, the UN Secretary-General made a statement in a 1965 letter to the
Government of Belgium regarding the UN-caused damages in the Congo: It has
always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the SecretaryGeneral, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the
Organization was legally liable. This policy is in keeping with generally
recognized legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. In addition, in regard to the United Nations
activities in the Congo, it is reinforced by the principles set forth in the
international conventions concerning the protection of the life and property of
civilian population [sic] during hostilities as well as by considerations of equity
and humanity which the United Nations cannot ignore.52

Here, the UN Secretary-General, without accepting any legal
obligation, acknowledges that it is UN organizational ‘policy’ to pay for
harms it has caused. The discretionary approach towards compensation is
also reflected in the language of a 1997 General Assembly Resolution
which “requests the Secretary-General to continue, in the new system, to
take into account, when considering all mission-related death and
disability claims, that such injury or death should be compensable . . . .”53
As a policy matter, compensation remains a discretionary issue that
“should be” rather than “is” payable.54
While the UN may have squarely and conscientiously “assumed its
liabilities for damage caused by members of its forces in the performance
of their duties” during the earliest UN peacekeeping operations,55 the
(discussing an instance of a claim made by a State against the UN).
49. C. F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 242 (1996).
50. G.A. Res. 1000 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/3354, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 1956).
51. U.N. Secretariat, Letter dated Feb. 3, 2004 from the Secretariat to the
International Law Commission, in Responsibility of International Organizations,
Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations, Int’l L. Comm’n,
56th Sess., May 3–June 4, July 5–Aug. 6 2004, § 2(G), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545 (June 25,
2004).
52. Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at 220.
53. Death and Disability Benefits, G.A. Res. 52/177, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/177
(Jan. 20, 1999).
54. Id.
55. U.N. Secretary General, Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations
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UN’s practice of paying damages has been predicated largely on moral
grounds rather than a legally articulated obligation to pay
compensation.56 In practice, this means that there is no external check,
outside of the withholding of dues by Member States, on the UN’s
exercise of its discretion to provide compensation when requested.57 The
discretion to accept or reject responsibility for potential wrongful UN
acts leaves numerous States like Bosnia with civilian victims in the
precarious position of relying on the UN’s good faith efforts to redress
injuries as it sees politically fit.58
With the potential for the ILC Project on Responsibility of
International Organizations to be mainstreamed by States, the driving
force, which is largely moral at present, may be slowly transformed into
a legalized regime. Given the statements of the Secretary-General in
1965,59 combined with a historical precedent for paying for damages
inflicted by peacekeeping troops on civilians,60 there may be an emerging
customary international rule that the UN must offer compensation when
it is responsible for a breach of international law. If customary
international law has reached the point when UN responsibility and
liability are beginning to crystallize, there remains a crucial deficit: an
absence of institutions capable of ensuring that an admissible claim of
responsibility can be judicially reviewed, rather than simply subject to ad
hoc judgments of UN agencies.
The current approach for trying to ensure that UN responsibility
translates into liability is largely a private, diplomatically-negotiated
matter outside of the review of public tribunals. Domestic courts that
Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters and
Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ¶¶
7–8, U.N. Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996).
56. Although the UN has a legal obligation to establish a mechanism to resolve legal
disputes between the UN and other parties, see Privileges and Immunities Convention,
supra note 23, § 29, the UN is immune from suit. Id. § 2. However, the UN has bolstered
its obligation to pay damages despite its immunity by citing to “the principles set forth in
the international conventions concerning the protection of the life and property of civilian
population during hostilities as well as . . . considerations of equity and humanity which
the United Nations cannot ignore.” Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at
220.
57. Cf. Norman Kempster, House Wants to Withhold Dues to U.N., L.A. TIMES (May
10, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/10/news/mn-61661 (threatening to
withhold UN dues unless the U.S. is put back on the Human Rights Commission).
58. See, e.g., Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of
Srebrenica/The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf (holding that the UN is immune from suit in this
instance).
59. Privileges and Immunities Study, supra note 48, at 219–20.
60. See, e.g., UN-Belgium Settlement, supra note 48.
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have challenged the compliance of the UN with international law,
including customary international law, have been stymied from
proceeding by claims of privileges and immunities and have been unable
to proceed to the merits of cases.61 Even when actions are attributed to
the UN, parties may be unable to collect any judgment. For example, the
District Court of The Hague in the Netherlands ruled in a civil action that
the actions of Dutch soldiers working for the UN Protection Force would
be “attributed, strictly, as a matter of principle to the United Nations.”62
However, the UN was never named as a party to this decision and there
was no indication in the court record of how the plaintiff could avail
himself of damages that had been attributed to the UN Protection Force.63
These ad hoc approaches of making qualified attribution rulings in
certain limited cases, while applying absolute privileges and immunities
in numerous other cases, has the potential to lead to at least two
substantial problems: the non-enforcement of international law against
international organizations and the inability to collect damages from
international organizations.
Notably, some UN bodies, and the World Bank, do allow for suit in
national courts.64 However, what results is an ad hoc approach as national
courts apply, in a piecemeal fashion, their national laws on immunity to
interpret international rights and obligations.65 The World Bank’s
constitutive statute provides that “[a]ctions may be brought against the
Bank only in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a
member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for
purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or
guaranteed securities.”66 What this means in practice is that a case
brought in the United States has the potential to result in a different legal
outcome regarding international obligations than a case in Germany.
Such disparate outcomes would depend on a number of factors, including
61. See, e.g., Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 juli 2008, JOR 2008, ¶¶ 5.16–5.22 (Mothers of
Srebrenica/ The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD6796&u_ljn=BD6796.
62. Rb.’s-Gravenhage 10 September 2008, JOR 2008, ¶ 4.11 (H.N./The State of the
Netherlands)
(Neth.),
available
at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BF0181.
63. Id.
64. International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement
art. 7(3), Dec. 27–Dec. 31, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD].
65. Compare Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that international organizations have virtually absolute immunity pursuant
to International Organizations Immunities Act), with Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space
Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 764–65 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that there are exceptions to
international organizations’ immunity pursuant to the International Organizations
Immunities Act).
66. IBRD, supra note 64, art. 7(3).
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system-wide approaches to law, familiarity of a judge with international
law, and constraints of respective domestic laws implementing
international obligations.
One of the recurring problems in addressing UN accountability is a
lack of certainty about where plaintiffs can bring cases identifying
potential UN responsibility under international law. As Professor
Reinisch observes:
In the case of certain international organizations, express treaty-based
constitutional provisions have even led to questions of whether or not the
respective organizations are bound by ‘extraconstitutional’ legal standards at all.
This has resulted in serious doubts about whether any forum has the power to
assess this issue.67

While ex gratia payments may satisfy the fundamental need for a
remedy without the potential complications of judicial review, this ad hoc
approach interferes with the progressive development of international
legal norms regarding responsibility. There is nothing systematic about
side-payments and there is the potential, particularly when there may be a
power imbalance between the UN and its Member State, that ex gratia
payments do not reflect the gravity of a particular violation.
The following section of this article explores the need to identify a
single, neutral, international judicial forum to adjudicate issues of UN
responsibility under international law. Under the current approach, the
UN is largely immune from any legal proceedings in domestic courts
unless it discretionarily submits to adjudication or enters a settlement
agreement.68 This approach is inadequate in terms of creating a balanced
rule of law framework within the UN.
III. UNIFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE ICJ OF UN
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
Given the ad hoc nature of dispute resolution involving UN
responsibility, there is a nagging issue of how to uniformly, yet
equitably, approach issues of UN responsibility and liability. This part
explores two proposals to address the need for a judicial review forum
for matters involving UN responsibility: 1) reviving historical efforts to
amend the ICJ Statute to give the ICJ contentious jurisdiction over the
UN and its specialized agencies, and 2) expanding the realm of ICJ
“binding advisory opinions” through a supplementary treaty requiring
disputes involving the UN and international legal responsibility to be
submitted to the ICJ.
The patchy legal landscape of scattered privileges and immunities
67. Reinisch, supra note 7, at 133.
68. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. 2, § 2; see, e.g.
UN-Belgium Settlement supra note 48.
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for the UN, combined with occasional binding decisions under the
advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ,69 generates uncertainty in assessing UN
responsibility. What is needed to ensure that principles of liability for
violations of international law are applied uniformly across the UN
system is a single judicial forum that is available to all States. Of course,
this forum should include actors knowledgeable in applying international
laws and principles. As the UN’s principal judicial organ, the bestsituated institution for this work is the ICJ.
Even though there has been no systematic review of disputes
involving UN responsibility, the Court has historically welcomed the
adjudication of matters involving the UN as part of their mission to
resolve international disputes using international law.70 Drawing on this
practice, in his 1995 address to the UN General Assembly, ICJ Judge
Mohammed Bedjaoui suggested a new relationship between States,
international organizations, and the Court:
States, subjects traditionally described as “primary” or “necessary” components
of the international legal order, are, in reality, no longer the only players in
international relations, or the only interlocutors where peacekeeping is
concerned. International life shows us every single day that, at this level, greater
account must be taken of other entities, notably, the international organizations.
Access to the Court’s contentious procedure, currently reserved for States alone,
may therefore now seem too narrow. Among the remedies found for these
shortcomings has been the incorporation, into certain treaties, of ad hoc clauses
laying down that, in the event of a dispute between the international organization
and the States specified therein, that organization will request the Court for an
advisory opinion, which the two parties agree will have a “decisive” or
“binding” effect. The technique referred to as that of “compulsory advisory
opinions” - whose very name underlines its singularity - is, however, no more
than a stopgap, which cannot be a substitute for full access by organizations with
international legal personality to the contentious procedure of the Court. 71

Judge Bedjaoui’s comments articulate a clear demand for expanding
ICJ contentious jurisdiction to encompass international organizations,
including the UN, in order to reflect a legal reality that has evolved since
1949. Contrary to what was envisioned at the drafting of the UN

69. See, e.g., Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organisation upon complaints made against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 84 (Oct. 23) (issuing an advisory
opinion that bound two parties in accordance with an agreement between those two
parties).
70. See Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (explaining the
ICJ’s ability issue advisory opinions to certain agencies and organs of the UN).
71. H.E. Mohammed Bedjaoui, President, Int’l Court of Justice, United Nations
General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Plenary: The International Court of Justice: What Will
Its
Future
Be?
(Oct.
11,
1995),
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=92&p1=6&p2=1&search=%22assemby%22.
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Charter,72 international organizations on behalf of coalitions of States
have assumed leadership roles in managing international conflict and
developing humanitarian aid.73 Yet, even in light of the organization’s
pivotal role in the international arena, UN actions are generally not
judicially reviewable.74 In Judge Bedjaoui’s comments, he is far more
dismissive of the possibility of securing a broader role for binding
advisory opinions than this article. As described below, while extending
contentious jurisdiction to the UN by amending Article 34 of the ICJ
Statute is legally desirable, it may be unrealistic. On the other hand,
negotiating a treaty providing for binding advisory opinions for
international legal disputes involving the UN would be more politically
palatable to States because it would not trigger a complex UN Charter
amendment procedure.
A. OPTION ONE: AMEND ARTICLE 34 OF THE ICJ STATUTE
Article 34 of the ICJ statute provides that “[o]nly states may be
parties in cases before the Court” thereby restricting the Court’s ratione
personae jurisdiction.75 While legal persons (natural or corporate) cannot
be named parties to an ICJ dispute,76 States may appear on behalf of a
non-State actor if there has been an international legal violation.77 When
the ICJ Statute was promulgated, the drafters did not provide standing for
private persons with disputes against their own States. This was
presumably because disputes between natural persons and States could be
handled under municipal law. While this rationale may make sense for
individual citizens or corporations, the rationale does not apply to
international organizations. This is especially true of the UN with its
72. For a discussion of the limited scope of early UN peacekeeping missions, see
Aiyaz Husain, The United States and the Failure of UN Collective Security: Palestine,
Kashmir, and Indonesia 1947-1948, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 583 (2007), and for a
discussion of UN gridlock due to United States-Soviet Union tension on the Security
Council, see id., at 594–96.
73. See The United Nations Today: International Peace and Security, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/aboutun/untoday/peacesec.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011);
The
United
Nations
Today:
Humanitarian
Action,
UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/untoday/haction.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
74. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, § 2 (providing
immunity to the UN “from every form of legal process” with the only exception being
when the UN voluntarily waives that immunity).
75. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(1).
76. See How the Court Works, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=6 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“Only States . . . may be
parties to contentious cases.”).
77. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icjcij.org/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2#2 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“[A] State may
take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which
its national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter . . . .”).
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bundle of privileges and immunities that shield it from the legal process
in municipal courts.78 Since the UN can have the ICJ give opinions
regarding States’ failure to comply with international obligations,79 due
process and fairness necessitate that the UN also be subject to the same
process when it is initiated by States.
Under Chapter II of the ICJ Statute, the UN’s role in the Court’s
contentious jurisdiction is restricted to being the provider of “information
relevant to cases before” the ICJ when the international organizations “on
their own initiative” or at the request of the Court present such
information.80 This secondary role in dispute resolution when the UN
serves as a consultant to the Court is inadequate. The role envisioned no
longer reflects the reality that intergovernmental organizations have
international obligations and thus may be responsible for violating
international law.
In order to secure binding decisions on UN liability, it is
theoretically possible to broaden Article 34 of the ICJ Statute to give the
UN standing under the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. This approach
has been proposed enthusiastically by jurists and academics over the last
50 years but has yet to garner enough political momentum.81
While theoretically possible, such an amendment would be a
difficult legal proposition since the amendment process is involved.
Specifically, under Article 69 of the ICJ Statute, the process would
mirror that required to amend the articles of the UN Charter.82 Any
amendment of the ICJ Statute needs the vote of two-thirds of the
members of the General Assembly and to be ratified by two-thirds of the
78. See, e.g., Hof’s-Gravenhage 30 mars 2010, JOR 2010 (Mothers of
Srebrenica/The State of the Netherlands and the United Nations) (Neth.), available at
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Netherlands/Mothers_of_Srebrenica_Judgm
ent_Court_of_Appeal_30-03-2010.pdf.
79. For an example of a case wherein the General Assembly was able to seek a
judicial intermediary concerning a dispute between the UN and State members, see Certain
Expenses of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20) which advises
on a refusal by the Soviet Union and other Member States to pay amounts the General
Assembly had assessed for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the former
Belgian Congo.
80. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(2).
81. See, e.g., ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 60–66 (1991) (concerning environmental and human rights
claims); KAREL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 236–37
(2002); Laurent Jully, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Recent Trends, 48 AM. J. INT’L
L. 380, 390–91 (1954); Bedjaoui, supra note 71.
82. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 69 (“Amendments to the present Statute shall be
effected by the same procedure as is provided by the Charter of the United Nations for
amendments to that Charter, subject however to any provisions which the General
Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council may adopt concerning the
participation of states which are parties to the present Statute but are not Members of the
United Nations.”).
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members of the UN, including all members of the Security Council.83
Achieving this level of international consensus may be politically
challenging. As described below, historical efforts to revise the ICJ
Statute have been subject to considerable debate among States already.
The idea of providing standing under the ICJ’s contentious
jurisdiction to international organizations is not a new idea and has a
relatively long history, nearly as long as the ICJ itself. When the ICJ was
created in June 1945 by statute, States were concerned with maintaining
continuity between the Permanent Court of International Justice and the
ICJ, newly created by the UN Charter.84 Under the League of Nations,
the Permanent Court had been organized exclusively to settle State-toState disputes grounded in the classic view of international law as a
discipline concerned exclusively with the rights and duties of States.85
At the 1945 UN Conference on International Organization where the
UN Charter was signed, some participants, such as Venezuela, proposed
that international organizations should have standing to appear before the
Court in some contentious matters.86 While the proposals were not
adopted by the conclusion of the conference, the idea remained in
circulation and negotiators agreed that international organizations should
be engaged in the court process. Specifically, Article 34, paragraph 2
provided that the Court could request information from public
international organizations on matters before the Court.87 Under
paragraph 3 of this article, the UN Registrar is required to communicate
with international organizations when there are questions about the
construction of a constituent instrument, or about an international
convention adopted by an international organization.88 But Article 34,
paragraph 1 remains steadfast that only States can participate in cases

83. U.N. Charter, art. 108 (“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force
for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two
thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”).
84. See id. art. 92.
85. See Permanent Court of International Justice Statute art. 34, Dec. 16, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S.
379
(1921),
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%206/v6.pdf (“Only States or
Members of the League of Nations can be parties in cases before the Court.”).
86. United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945,
Proposed Draft of Article 34 Submitted by the Delegation of Venezuela, 13 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 480, Doc. 284 (English) IV/1/24 (May 14, 1945) (proposing that the text of Article
34(2) be drafted so that “[u]pon request from any of the intergovernmental international
organizations or offices dependent on the United Nations, the Court shall settle conflicts of
jurisdiction which may arise among them”).
87. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34(2).
88. Id. art. 34(3).
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where the Court exercises its contentious jurisdiction.89 Even though the
articles provided a role for international organizations under Article 34(2)
and 34(3),90 the UN was still not permitted to appear as a party in a
contentious matter.91
The ICJ’s advisory opinion in its 1949 Reparation for Injuries
signaled that the UN may eventually become subject to ICJ binding
judicial review.92 The Court affirmed that the UN has the capacity to
bring international claims because of its status as an international
organization formed under the Charter.93 No specific source of the right
to bring claims was discussed and the Court simply noted that it was
“clear”94 that the UN had the right to bring claims for damages through
such methods as “protest, request for an enquiry, negotiation, and request
for submission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court in so far as this may
be authorized by the [ICJ’s] Statute.”95 In spite of the Court’s language,
which suggests that the UN might bring general claims under the ICJ
Statute, the reality is that the only claims “authorized by the Statute”
available to the UN are advisory opinions issued under Article 65 of the
ICJ Statute.96 Article 34(1) remains unequivocal in its limitation of the
ICJ’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction to States alone.97
In the 1950s, groups of legal experts began to raise concerns about
the state-centric limitations of the ICJ.98 In 1954 the Institute de Droit
International expressed concern about the inability of international
organizations whose membership includes States to appear as
respondents before the ICJ.99 In addition, the International Law
Association, as a group of legal experts, proposed in 1956 an amendment
to the ICJ Statute such that the UN and its specialized agencies would be

89. Id. art. 34(1).
90. Id. art. 34(2)–(3).
91. Id. art. 34(1).
92. Reparation for Injuries, supra note 28.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 177.
96. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65.
97. Id. art. 34(1).
98. See, e.g., WELLENS, supra note 81 (discussing two organizations of legal
scholars: the International Law Association and the Institut de Droit International).
99. Id. at 237 (citing Resolutions Adopted by the Institute at its Session at its Session
at Aix-en-Provence, 22 April—1 May 1954, 45(II) INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L 296, 298
(1954)). The Institut de Droit International is an invitation only, independent organization
of legal experts. Statutes, INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L art. 1, art. 5, http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/navig_statutes.html, (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). After being founded in 1873,
it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1904 for its work on promoting arbitration
between States as a means of peaceful conflict resolution. History, INSTITUT DE DROIT
INT’L, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_history.html, (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
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able to appear before the Court in contentious cases.100 Both the Institute
de Droit International and the International Law Association were
concerned with ensuring that international adjudication reflected the
emerging relationships among primary international actors, including
international organizations.
In 1977, the U.S. Department of State, in response to Senate
Resolution 78 (May 9, 1974),101 published a study on whether the United
States should undertake diplomatic efforts to widen access to the ICJ for
individuals,
corporations,
non-governmental
organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, and regional organizations for cases
raising questions of international law.102 The report noted that widening
access to the Court would increase the Court’s contribution to the
development of international law by promoting “unification in the
interpretation and application of international law.”103 The report
examined the possibilities of increasing the number of organizations
capable of requesting advisory opinions or amending Article 34(1) of the
Statute.104 On the issue of amending Article 34(1), the Department of
State was open to the idea of international organizations being subject to
contentious jurisdiction as long as both the General Assembly and
Security Council agreed on any potential submission of a matter to
contentious jurisdiction.105 The Department of State recognized in the
1970s that achieving the needed votes for an amendment would be
difficult but that it supported an amendment “in principle . . . at some
later, more propitious time.”106
Scholars and practitioners have urged for some time that
international organizations, including the UN, should be subjected to
ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. One year after the formation of the ICJ,
Director-General of the International Labour Organisation Wilfred Jenks
criticized the ICJ’s bifurcated jurisdictional structure, finding that the
“[i]nconvenient and irritating restrictions upon access to the Court by the
specialized agencies will encourage the latter to rely upon ad hoc
tribunals for the determination of questions which might more
appropriately be referred to the Court.”107
Laurent Jully observed arbitration and settlement trends in 1954 and
100. WELLENS, supra note 81, at 236.
101. S. Res. 78, 93d Cong. (1974) (enacted).
102. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STUDY ON WIDENING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 187 (1977).
103. Id. at 190.
104. Id. at 196–200.
105. See id. at 201.
106. Id. at 205.
107. C. Wilfred Jenks, The Status of International Organizations in Relation to the
International Court of Justice, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOC’Y 1, 19 (1946).
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emphasized the need for consistency in international law, writing that
“the revision of Article 34 will be one of the first tasks to be undertaken
as being capable of bringing about an important improvement in this
special province of international law.”108 Jully, noting the light docket of
the ICJ at the time, expressed concern that:
It is somewhat paradoxical that the numerous specialized agencies, which stand
in close relationship to the United Nations, should be obliged to set up separate
and ad hoc bodies for the settlement of future disputes, while the Charter has
established, or rather confirmed in existence, a first-class judicial organ,
benefiting from a long experience as well as a high reputation, and which could
certainly deal with more work than is at present being entrusted to it.109

In terms of institutions structured to hear public international legal
disputes, the ICJ is perfectly situated to adjudicate any public
international legal dispute involving the UN.
Cambridge University lawyer Sir Elihu Lauterpacht argued that
international organizations should have the power to present claims to the
ICJ.110 In particular, he observed that where an international organization
acts as a defendant in a given case, such as a responsibility case, the
ICJ’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction would be especially reasonable
because such a case would involve a dispute over international law.111 As
he commented:
While [the rights and duties of international organizations] can, of course, be
resolved in any particular ad hoc arrangement for dispute settlement involving
international organizations . . . Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ should be so
amended that international organizations are no longer a priori excluded from
participation in the contentious work of that Court.112

As Lauterpacht observes, the ICJ is the most appropriate institution
to hear cases when the UN is in conflict with a State or group of States.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the United Kingdom’s counsel to the ICJ,
observed that there “[t]here is a strong case, though it may not be free
from all difficulty” for international organizations to be litigants.113 He
observed:
It seems probable that had the basic drafting of the Court’s Statute been carried
out within, say, the last twenty years, instead of over half a century ago, the
present paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Statute—while not necessarily including
international organizations in terms as entitled to be parties as litigants—would
at least not have been drafted in such a way . . . as clearly to exclude them.114

What Sir Fitzmaurice recognized over 30 years ago is how
108. Jully, supra note 81, at 391.
109. Id.
110. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 81, at 61–65.
111. See id. at 66.
112. Id.
113. Gerald Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 478–79 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
114. Id. at 479.
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anachronistic the ICJ Statute is in its treatment of international
organizations as disputants. However, in 1945, few States recognized that
the UN would have legal claims to assert and that States might also have
claims to assert against the UN.115
Shabtai Rosenne, author of numerous treatises on the ICJ, explained
why nothing has happened to secure Article 34 reform in spite of
numerous suggestions for it. Professor Rosenne related that even though
there appeared to be a practical need for UN standing in contentious
cases, the absence of political will explains the lack of reform.116 He
illustrated his premise with two proposals presented by the States of
Guatemala and Costa Rica in 1997 to the Special Committee on the
Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
Organization.117 Both of these proposals requested amendment of the ICJ
Statute to allow the UN and other international organizations to be parties
to contentious cases.118 When the proposals were considered, the Special
Committee adopted no conclusions,119 and the General Assembly
expressed its intent to take no action that might have implications for any
changes in the UN Charter or the Statute.120 In 1999 Guatemala withdrew
its proposal to extend contentious jurisdiction to certain international
organizations and to evaluate whether international organizations
generally should have direct access to the ICJ’s contentious
jurisdiction.121 According to Rosenne, the proposal was “feasible
115. See id. (“[T]he notion of international organizations of States as having an
international personality of their own separate from and additional to that of their
individual component members . . . had not gained any real currency.”).
116. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 1920-2005, VOL. II JURISDICTION 632–33 (4th ed. 2006).
117. See id.
118. See Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the
Role of the Org., Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1997, Possible Amendments to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice to Extend its Competence with Respect to Contentious
Matters to Disputes Between States and International Organizations, Working Paper
Submitted by Guatemala, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.95 (Jan. 28, 1997) [hereinafter
Guatemala Proposal]; Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the Strengthening
of the Role of the Org., Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1997, Possible Amendments to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice to Extend its Competence with Respect to Contentious
Matters to Disputes Between States and International Organizations, Working Paper
Submitted by Costa Rica, Alternative Drafting to the Working Paper Submitted by Costa
Rica, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.97 (Feb. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Costa Rica Proposal].
119. See Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/53/33; GAOR, 53d Sess.,
Supp. No. 33 (1998) (refraining from recommending action upon the proposals).
120. G.A. Res. 53/106, ¶ 4(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/106 (Dec. 10, 1998).
121. See Special Committee On UN Charter Concludes Two-Week Session, SCIENCE
BLOG
(Apr.
23,
1999),
http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/L/1999/A/un990575.html
(“Marja-Liisa Lehto (Finland), Chairman of the Special Committee, commended the
flexibility shown by the Guatemala delegation in withdrawing a proposal that did not
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technically but not politically, at least for the time being.”122 Guatemala’s
speech withdrawing its proposal before the Special Committee reflected
on the political hurdles of amending the ICJ Statute with reserved
optimism:
We consider it advantageous that the predominantly favourable views that,
primarily in the academic area, have been expressed with regard to the
possibility of expanding the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the manner proposed have been
complemented by the reaction of States to that possibility . . . . We consider that
we should now take a long-term view and have regard to both the rapidity with
which everything evolves in this era of profound and unpredictable changes, and
the importance that intergovernmental organizations, whose number grows
incessantly, are increasingly taking on. We believe that within this long-term
perspective the hope subsists that the proposal we have presented will one day
be adopted.123

As the fifty-plus years of effort to amend Article 34 of the ICJ
Statute suggest, international law evolves slowly and States, as well as
other key players, are rarely inclined to experiment with new legal
arrangements. Given the incremental nature of international legal reform,
it is not surprising the U.S. Department of State in the 1970s suggested
waiting for a “more propitious time” to seek amendment of the ICJ
Statute.124 Mirroring this sentiment, in the late 1990s Guatemala was
willing to pin its hope for reform on a “long-term perspective.”125
While it is not clear that the time for amendment is any more
“propitious” today than it was in the late 1990s, the efforts of Costa Rica
and Guatemala provide guidance for what an acceptable amendment
might look like.126 The two proposals to amend Article 34(1) of the
Statute were amenable to several States in 1997.127 The Guatemala
garner support.”).
122. ROSENNE, supra note 116, at 633.
123. Translation of a Statement by Guatemala at the 5th Mtg. of the Sixth Committee
on the Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (Agenda Item 159) (Oct. 13 1999),
http://www.un.int/guatemala/english/speeches/juridico/1999/13-oct-1999.html
[hereinafter, Statement by Guatemala].
124. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 102, at 205 (“[S]upport in principle of such
a proposal represents a sound and forward-looking approach.”).
125. See Statement by Guatemala, supra note 123 (“We believe that within this longterm perspective the hope subsists that the proposal we have presented will one day be
adopted.”).
126. See Guatemala Proposal, supra note 118 (proposing amendments to Article 34);
Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 118 (proposing amendments to Article 34).
127. See, e.g., Press Release, Calls for Burden-Sharing Mechanism to Ease Sanctions
Effects on Third States, As Sixth Committee Continues Discussion of Report of Charter
Committee, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3075 (Oct. 20, 1998) (amenable to Georgia); Press
Release, Sixth Committee Opens Review of Report of Charter Committee Discussing
Effect of Sanctions on Third States, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3073 (Oct. 16, 1998)
(amenable to Cuba). See also Statement by Guatemala, supra note 123 (referring to 1978
support for the principal of expanded jurisdiction by eighteen States, including two
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Proposal included an amendment of Article 34(1) and the addition of a
number of new articles.128 The amendment of Article 34(1) opened the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to the “United Nations or any other
international organization comprised of States” as long as one of three
things was true: the constituent instrument of the organizations permitted
ICJ jurisdiction, the State members of the organization agreed in a treaty
to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction for the organization, or the State parties to
the dispute and the organization agreed to refer the dispute to the
Court.129 The Costa Rica Proposal built on the Guatemala Proposal but
did not restrict Article 34(1) to international organizations comprised
only of States; it permitted any international organization that was
authorized by its constituent instrument to seek ICJ compulsory
jurisdiction.130
The greatest hurdle to making the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction
include the UN is, as commentators have pragmatically observed, the
entirety of the ICJ amendment process. The amendment process is
straightforward yet lengthy. Article 69 of the ICJ Statute provides that an
ICJ amendment is the same procedurally as a UN Charter amendment. 131
The Court has the power to propose amendments to the SecretaryGeneral who will then propose these amendments to States.132 As
Rosenne alluded to in his treatise on the ICJ, amending the ICJ Statute is
not really a technical problem of updating the Statute to reflect current
international legal realities, but a problem of political will and political
inertia.133
The problem lies in the political constraints of securing an
amendment that is procedurally equivalent to a UN Charter amendment.
The UN Charter provides in Article 108 that an amendment to its Charter
would require an adoption by two-thirds of the members of the General
Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the UN,
including all of the permanent members of the Security Council.134
permanent members).
128. See Guatemala Proposal, supra note 118.
129. Id. § B.
130. See Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 118.
131. There is additional language in the ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 69, providing
that the amendment process is subject to General Assembly provisions that may be
adopted concerning the participation of States which are parties to the ICJ Statute but not
members of the UN. Presently all parties to the ICJ Statute are also members of the UN.
See States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, INT’L CT. OF J., http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/ index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=b (last visited 23 Sept. 2011)
(listing no States as parties to ICJ but not members of the UN).
132. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 70.
133. See ROSENNE, supra note 116, at 633 (“The view was expressed that the
proposal was feasible technically but not politically, at least for the time being.”).
134. U.N. Charter art. 108.
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Likewise, an amendment to the ICJ Statute would require the same twothirds adoption and ratification from the UN’s current 192 Member
States.135 The reaction of the permanent members of the Security Council
remains an unknown, especially as to whether they might exercise their
veto power under Article 108.136 Among the permanent Security Council
members, only the United Kingdom has recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court over itself, suggesting that the United Kingdom
may be open to compulsory jurisdiction being extended further.137 France
and Russia have also availed themselves of the ICJ’s contentious
jurisdiction.138 As described above, while the United States expressed in
its domestic policy thirty years ago an interest in broadening access to the
ICJ, it is unclear whether the same policy reform interest remains.139
China has never appeared before the ICJ.140
Moreover, a request to open up an amendment process like that of
the UN Charter is likely to stall because of its potential to influence other
aspects of UN governance that are currently disputed. An opportunity to
revise the ICJ Statute may be perceived by some States as a backdoor
opportunity to reinvigorate debates that have been unsuccessfully
concluded over reforming the whole UN institutional framework. The
larger questions of other areas of UN reform requiring the same series of
votes from the General Assembly, ratifications by Member States, and
approval by the Security Council would quickly dwarf concerns of
institutionalizing ICJ contentious jurisdiction over issues involving UN
responsibility.
There is one other issue that requires discussion when considering
whether Article 34 reform would be sufficient to review UN
responsibility and accountability. Even if international organizations in
general, and the UN in particular, were able to appear before the ICJ, it is
unclear as to whether they would be compelled to appear. One of the
recurring issues with pursuing a judicial matter against the UN is the

135. Compare ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art 70 (adopting the U.N. Charter
amendment procedure), with U.N. Charter art. 108 (requiring a two-thirds vote to amend
the U.N. Charter).
136. Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, 26 WASH.
QUARTERLY, Autumn 2003, at 147, 150.
137. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L
CT. OF J., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2011) (listing 66 countries submitting to ICJ art. 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction).
138. See List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 By Date of Introduction,
INT’L CT. OF J., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (last visited Sept. 23,
2011) [hereinafter List of ICJ Cases] (listing all countries which have appeared before the
ICJ, including France and Russia).
139. See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text.
140. See List of ICJ Cases, supra note 138 (omitting China).
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prevalence of absolute immunity.141 Courts have been reluctant to find
that the UN has waived its immunity to appear in municipal courts.142
Unless the UN was somehow required by the agreement of UN Member
States to submit to compulsory jurisdiction by an amendment of Article
36, the UN may very well choose not to submit its disputes to the ICJ’s
contentious jurisdiction. Instead, the UN may continue to resolve
international legal disputes concerning its responsibility in an ad hoc
fashion. Simply granting the UN standing under Article 34 would, in and
of itself, not be sufficient since the UN would then be able to
strategically decide when it would appear. States with unresolved public
law complaints against the UN who seek judicial resolution need greater
certainty that the UN will appear. The following section looks at one
judicial mechanism that could improve UN accountability without
amending the ICJ Statute.
B. OPTION TWO: OBTAIN BINDING ADVISORY OPINION UNDER
SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
Presently only States can receive judicial review of contentious
matters by the ICJ under Article 34.143 UN organs and UN specialized
agencies are limited to requesting advisory opinions under Article 65
which provides that “[t]he Court may give an advisory opinion on any
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request.”144
While the Court does deliberate on matters involving UN rights and
responsibilities under its advisory jurisdiction, these opinions are
considered to have less weight than a similarly situated contentious
jurisdiction decision.145 In part, this goes to the issue of whether the
deliberations of the Court are res judicata when the ICJ acts in its
advisory capacity, as opposed to its contentious capacity. Ordinarily in a
contentious matter, the principle of stare decisis does not apply, since a
decision only binds the parties to a particular case.146 Even so, the Court
will frequently rely on previous cases as being instructive to the Court in
their legal reasoning.147 Still, in issuing advisory opinions, one may
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. See, e.g., supra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text.
143. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 34.
144. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65.
145. See André Gros, Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP
JESSUP 313, 315 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972) (explaining the distinction
between advisory opinions and “judgments”).
146. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 59.
147. See Gros, supra note 145, at 315 (explaining that the common distinction
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wonder whether the ICJ is simply providing well-reasoned suggestions
rather than legal analyses.
Alexander Fachiri, writing about the Permanent Court of
International Justice on which the ICJ was largely modeled, suggested
that international court advisory opinions should not be distinguished
from contentious decisions, since the deliberative processes are the
same.148 He wrote:
It is submitted that the principles laid down and points decided in advisory
opinions have the same effect by way of precedent as the judgments of the
Court, and will contribute to an equal degree in the development of international
law . . . . The Court itself has shown its appreciation of the importance of its
advisory opinions by framing them with elaboration and including a full
statement of the reasons upon which the conclusions arrived at are based. 149

The modern interpretation is that generally, unless there is language
in a given treaty requiring parties to request a binding advisory opinion
from the ICJ, such an opinion will have no binding force.150 In the realm
of ascertaining responsibility and assigning liability, the inability to bind
parties to a particular decision is problematic. Yet as Fachiri implies,
there is no reason that the Court, acting under its Article 65 powers,
cannot issue decisions with the same binding force as a contentious
decision.151 After all, the Court uses similar procedures in an advisory
case as it does in a contentious case,152 and the Court is still exercising
authority in a judicial fashion.
International legal practitioners have perceived this “double
standard” problem and have sought to remedy it through a novel
approach of applying the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. One such
approach was formulated by Laurent Jully, who observed in the 1950s
that international organizations were finding alternative approaches when
seeking dispute resolution:
In order to evade the obstacle of Article 34—perhaps not as formidable as it
looks at first—public international organizations have used two distinct legal
devices: The first is a treaty provision whereby a dispute as to the interpretation
or application of the treaty in question . . . shall be submitted to the Court for an

between advisory opinions and judgments is not a rigid barrier).
148. See ALEXANDER FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE, AND WORK 71 (1925).
149. Id.
150. See MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AS THE PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 110 (2003)
(explaining competing views regarding ICJ opinions).
151. See FACHIRI, supra note 148, at 69–70; ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 65.
152. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 68 (“In the exercise of its advisory functions
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.”). Articles 66
and 67 furthermore permit interested parties to furnish information on the question and
require advisory opinions to be delivered publicly, respectively. Id. arts. 66–67.
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advisory opinion, it being clearly understood that the parties will consider the
opinion given by the Court as decisive. . . . The other device used by
international organizations is the classical one of arbitration. 153

In light of the presently non-binding nature of advisory opinions,
one possible solution exists in the development of a supplementary treaty
requiring the UN to submit to advisory opinions. This paper will not
explore arbitration as a second device to avoid “the obstacle of Article
34”154 since arbitration lacks some of the important procedural
components of the ICJ. For example, unlike Article 34 decisions or
advisory opinions, arbitration reports may be kept confidential from the
public. In spite of the advantages of efficiency generally associated with
arbitration, the evolution of public international law must remain a matter
for public deliberations.155
In some limited instances, treaties have been negotiated providing
the ICJ with the ability to issue binding opinions under its Article 65
powers. These treaties, such as the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations156 and the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,157 contain clauses referring
a dispute between the treaty members to the ICJ for a final, binding
decision. The “compromissory clauses” in various international
agreements requesting ICJ resolution of disputes between the UN and a
State have been recognized by some scholars as adequate, albeit indirect,
legal authority for triggering ICJ decisions under Article 65 of the ICJ
Statute which might bind the parties.158
The legal reasoning allowing for such binding advisory opinions, in
spite of there being no such authority in the ICJ Statute or Rules, was
articulated early in the ICJ’s existence in the Judgments of Administrative
Tribunal of ILO case.159 The Court took the position that the ILO statute
at issue160 in the case was nothing more than “a rule of conduct for the
153. Jully, supra note 81 at 389–90.
154. Id. at 389.
155. The ICJ Statute already recognizes the transparency advantages in ensuring that
deliberations on public international matters remain public. Article 46 of the ICJ Statute,
supra note 11, provides that “The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall
decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted.”
156. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. VIII, § 30.
157. Privileges and Immunities of the UN, supra note 27, art. IX, §§ 31–32.
158. See Roberto Ago, “Binding” Advisory Opinions of the International Court of
Justice, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 439, 441 (1991) (summarizing the work of Professor Paolo
Benvenuti) (“From this perspective, the quality of a ‘decision,’ the ‘binding force’
attributed under certain conditions to an advisory opinion, far from being an exception to
the rule, is consistent with the natural and customary effects of the definition of rights and
obligations by the Court in exercising its advisory jurisdiction.”).
159. Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of ILO upon complaints made against
UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct. 23).
160. See generally Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
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Executive Board, a rule determining the action to be taken by it on the
Opinion of the Court.”161 In a later decision, the Court reasoned that as
long as it does not feign to be acting under the ICJ Statute or Rules when
it issues a “binding advisory opinion,” it could issue advisory opinions
that would functionally bind the parties.162 Whether a decision was
binding or not in practice was of little concern to the Court as long as the
parties did not invoke the ICJ Statute or Rules to transform an advisory
opinion into a “binding” advisory opinion.
In many cases, the subject of “binding” advisory opinions is largely
a matter for academic debate since there are few treaties providing for
ICJ review in cases of dispute with UN institutions. They include
headquarter agreements, privileges and immunities agreements, and
arrangements related to specific UN facilities.163 There is no language in
general subject multilateral treaties under which the UN is expected to
invoke the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction to conclusively decide a matter
between parties. For example, existing human rights treaties,
environmental treaties, and humanitarian law treaties do not explicitly
address UN responsibility or liability.164 Yet this omission leaves a
lacuna in jurisprudence where States, as individual members within a
general-subject treaty regime, are subject to international judicial review
mechanisms that the UN evades. Therefore, the UN remains free of
accountability as long as it has not specifically consented to bringing a
dispute with a State or another UN agency to the ICJ. In practice, this
means that there are few opportunities to judicially review the
responsibility of the UN for any breach of either customary international
law or treaty law.
Outside of the small population of treaties concluded between the
UN and States that invoke the mechanism of “binding” advisory
Organization, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/about/statute.htm.
161. Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of ILO, supra note 159, at 84.
162. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, ¶¶ 39–40 (July 12).
163. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations art. 66, Mar. 20, 1986,
25 I.L.M. 543, 578 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Agreement for the Establishment in
Cairo of a Middle Eastern Regional Radioisotope Centre for the Arab Countries art. XVI,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/38 (Oct. 18, 1962); Agreement Relating to the Headquarters of the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in Thailand, UN–Thai., art. XIII, May
26, 1954, 260 U.N.T.S. 35; Agreement Regulating Conditions for the Operation, in Chile,
of the Headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, UN–Chile, art.
XI, Feb. 16, 1953, 314 U.N.T.S. 49.
164. Treaties, as primary sources of international law, are generally negotiated
between States and cannot bind the UN unless the UN is an explicit party to the treaty. The
UN is not a party to existing human rights, environmental, or humanitarian law treaties.
While treaties can articulate specific duties and roles for the UN, State negotiators have
declined to assign legal responsibility to the UN.
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jurisdiction, there exists a failure to agree upon a binding mechanism to
hold the UN responsible for international legal violations. This failure
remains a substantial, systematic problem. Even in recent international
discussions over recommended environmental liability mechanisms,
there has been no explicit recognition of the possibility for disputes
arising between the UN and States. For example, in a recent document
designed to ensure liability mechanisms for victims of pollution and
environmental damages,165 the Committee of Permanent Government
Representatives to the UN Environmental Programme encouraged each
State to create domestic law that would assess strict liability to operators
for activities dangerous to the environment.166 Notably, the drafters
focused exclusively on domestic remedies. They never contemplated that
the UN itself could engage in dangerous environmental activities and
that, unlike private operators who may be subject to municipal courts of
law, the UN could avail itself of certain privileges and immunities that
would shield it from operator liability under domestic law.167 This
oversight, or deliberate omission, is significant. In some respects, the
UN, as a multilateral institution that frequently operates across borders,
has far greater potential for creating environmentally dangerous
conditions than many UN Member States who are disengaged from
global affairs.168
Judge Bedjaoui, in his comments to the General Assembly, was
highly critical of binding advisory opinions, declaring them “stopgap
measures” that failed to address the underlying need to amend the ICJ
Statute to reflect the role of international organizations as international
decision makers.169 However, these hybrid opinions should not be so
165. Executive Director of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment
Programme, Appendum, Draft Revised Guidelines for the Development of Domestic
Legislation on Liability, Response Action, and Compensation for Damage Caused by
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GCSS.XI/8/Add.1 (Dec.
3, 2009).
166. Id. at 5–8.
167. An example of the UN causing domestic environmental damage could occur if
the UN leaves unintentional environmental contamination at military bases as part of its
peacekeeping operations.
168. The UN employs approximately 64,000 staff, see Questions & Answers about the
UN: Who Works at the UN?, http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/index.asp?id=160 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2011), which is equivalent to the population of some Member States, including
Dominica,
U.S.
Department
of
State,
Background
Note:
Dominica,
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/do/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011), and the Marshall Islands,
U.S.
Department
of
State,
Background
Note:
Marshall
Islands,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). One hopes that
some of these staff are involved in due diligence work on large, potentially
environmentally damaging infrastructure projects.
169. Bedjaoui, supra note 71 (“The technique referred to as that of “compulsory
advisory opinions” - whose very name underlines its singularity - is, however, no more
than a stopgap, which cannot be a substitute for full access by organizations with
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readily dismissed. Instead, they should be regarded as offering a unique
opportunity for reforming the UN system to better reflect the heightened
role of international organizations in implementing the international
system. In addition, opting for binding advisory opinions would not
trigger the general amendment process that a revision of Article 34
requires. To the extent that States agree in principle that the UN should
be held accountable where there has been a demonstrable breach of
international law, there is room for creating a uniform judicial
mechanism. One possibility is the adoption of a narrowly–tailored treaty
that would require both UN institutions and UN Member States to
submit disputes between them that arise under treaty or customary
international law, including disputes on behalf of injured third–parties, to
the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ for a binding opinion. Such a treaty
would avoid the problem of these opinions currently being applied as
“stopgap measures” and would provide a degree of certainty, uniformity,
and predictability in the context of dispute settlement between States and
the UN.
Regardless of their non-binding nature, it is apparent that the UN
views current advisory opinions by the ICJ as important. For example,
the UN has complied with opinions obtained under the ICJ’s advisory
jurisdiction by recommending that the Security Council act in accordance
with ICJ opinions, establishing Special Committees to respond to ICJ
opinions, and passing resolutions specifically adopting ICJ opinions.170
Even without the Court’s exercise of contentious jurisdiction binding the
UN, the UN has deemed advisory opinions as authoritative judicial
decisions.171 From the perspective of the UN’s existing compliance with
ICJ opinions, compelling the UN to submit to the Article 65 advisory
capacity of the Court should not lead to widely different outcomes than if
the Court exercised compulsory jurisdiction over the UN under its Article
34 powers to resolve contentious disputes. Rather, it would ensure a
greater degree of accountability vis-à-vis the UN.
Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between
States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations provides some drafting guidance on measures that might

international legal personality to the contentious procedure of the Court.”).
170. AMR, supra note 150, at 116–119.
171. See ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 68 (“[While exercising its advisory functions]
the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.”), art. 59
(“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties in respect of
that particular case.”); see also Richard Falk, International Court of Justice, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 403, 404 (Joel Krieger et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2001).
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ensure binding advisory jurisdiction over the UN.172 Article 66 provides
that in cases of interpretation under the Vienna Convention the ICJ may
give a binding decision if 1) “a State is a party to the dispute to which
one or more international organizations are parties” and the State asks the
General Assembly, Security Council or another qualified UN agency “to
request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice” or 2)
the UN, as a party to the dispute, decides to request an advisory
opinion.173
While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States
and International Organizations provides an approach for both States and
the UN to trigger ICJ binding advisory jurisdiction,174 under neither
approach is the UN compelled to appear. Rather, the State and the UN
both “may” request opinions. The notion of exercising discretionary
power in judicial review is problematic when parties have reached an
impasse. In the context of the ICJ’s discretionary power under Article 65
of the ICJ Statute, scholars have argued that:
[T]he idea of discretionary power, even if it is moderated by the safeguards
found in the Court’s jurisprudence, is puzzling. The textual argument on which it
is based (the “may” in Article 65 of the Statute) is very weak and should yield to
the spirit of the provision on the advisory function which testifies to the
obligatory co-operation of the Court with the UN organs in the solution of legal
questions.175

If the language of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations was included in a future
treaty on adjudicating UN responsibility, there is some question as to
whether the UN would ever choose to submit its disputes to ICJ review.
When States want to be certain that they have a forum to address
UN responsibility for international legal violations, the UN should be
required to submit any live dispute concerning potential UN
responsibility or liability under international law that has not been
resolved in a reasonable amount of time to the ICJ for an advisory
opinion under Article 65. As with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and International Organizations and other
conventions providing for “binding advisory opinions,” the States, as
well as the UN, should agree that any ICJ decision would be equivalent
to a judgment and binding on all parties.
However, a treaty that only requires the UN to submit disputes to
the ICJ will not, by itself, be adequate to address UN responsibility or
liability. In order to avoid the shield of privileges and immunities that
172. Vienna Convention, supra note 163, at 578.
173. Id.
174. Supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text.
175. BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 270
(2d ed. 2000) (emphasis in original).
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have prevented domestic courts, such as the Dutch courts,176 from
entering judgments of responsibility and liability against the UN, any
supplementary treaty must explicitly waive the invocation of UN
privileges and immunities for cases referred to the ICJ for an advisory
decision. The treaty might also, for purposes of justice and efficiency,
establish a reasonable time frame within which the UN would be
expected to submit unresolved disputes, such as within one year of the
dispute being brought to the attention of the UN. A timeline would
encourage amicable settlements of dispute that might otherwise disrupt
cooperative relations among Member States and the UN.
With the adoption of a treaty assigning binding advisory jurisdiction
over most international legal claims involving the UN as a party, there
are a number of advantages that solve justice and efficiency concerns.
For example, the single venue for adjudication, the ICJ, avoids the
possibility of fragmented interpretations of international law by various
domestic systems or internal UN administrative agencies. In addition, the
existence of a single venue ensures that domestic privileges and
immunities do not insulate the UN from international responsibility and
liability claims. Likewise, the single ICJ venue should provide continuity
in international decision-making since the ICJ will have a history of the
cases it has previously decided and may employ similar analytical
frameworks in determining responsibility and allocating liability. Thus,
in addition to consistency in the application of international law, this
proposal would also provide some consistency across adjudication
involving questions of responsibility and international organizations.
Any treaty concluded among State parties could exempt certain
types of cases from ICJ advisory review. While this paper proposes that
the ICJ should be the court of first resort for matters that implicate
international organization responsibility, not all cases would necessarily
be appropriate for its review. In cases that chiefly implicate UN
administrative matters, such as interpretation of UN employment rules
for example, review arguably should remain under the jurisdiction of the
UN Administrative Tribunal. Indeed, Former ICJ Judge Roberto Ago
eloquently advocated this position when the ICJ issued a “binding”
advisory opinion on an internal UN matter. He stated that the ICJ had
exceeded its authority, since “the International Court of Justice is thus
compelled to resolve questions that, for the most part, do not involve the
application of those rules of international law” which it is mandated to
apply.177
Another type of case that might be exempted from judicial review

176. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
177. Ago, supra note 158, at 444–45.
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would be the review of the legality of resolutions by UN bodies.178 In
Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, the ICJ was
confronted with the legality of a specific Security Council Resolution
requiring Libya to submit to diplomatic and commercial sanctions in
response to failing to comply with another Security Council Resolution
requiring it to surrender two of its nationals for trial in the United
Kingdom.179 Ultimately, the Court never ruled on the legality of the
Security Council Resolutions and instead limited its decision to holding
that the UN Charter trumped the 1971 Montreal Convention.180 In spite
of the ICJ being the lead judicial organ for the UN, there would likely be
strong resistance from Security Council members if the legality of
specific Security Council Resolutions were to be the subject of an ICJ
advisory opinion. However, examining whether a UN agency has
properly complied with a resolution issued by a UN body could be
suitable for an advisory opinion.
The proposal for a new treaty to waive UN privileges and
immunities before the ICJ and recognize ICJ jurisdiction over disputes
among UN agencies, as well as between States and the UN, is a
reasonable end result of fully recognizing UN legal personality. Given
the UN’s articulated concerns with promoting international
accountability, the UN might even be an active proponent of a treaty that
strengthens the ICJ’s existing powers as the premier public international
legal court. Even so, there could be institutional resistance within the
UN. Current dispute resolution of matters involving the UN and breaches
of international law is predicated on diplomatic interventions. UN
officials may be uneasy with relinquishing case-by-case diplomatic
solutions to a panel of judges. Hopefully, UN officials would not lose
sight of the benefits of such a treaty. After all, the negotiation of a treaty
would address the recurring issue that States, acting both on their own
behalf and on the behalf of third parties, lack any adequate judicial forum
for engaging the UN. Furthermore, UN support of a treaty could enhance
the legitimacy of the UN as an institution of good governance.
Correctly worded, a treaty would solve other logistical issues as
178. See Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council:
Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United
Nations?, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309 (Apr. 1997) (arguing that the ICJ has some limited
authority to review Security Council decisions); Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security
Council, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1996) (describing how the overlap between the ICJ and the
Security Council will inevitably lead to some judicial review).
179. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 1992
I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14) discontinued in Order, 2003 I.C.J. 152 (Sept. 10).
180. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, ¶ 42.
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well. For example, the explicit identification of the ICJ as the single
judicial dispute settlement body responsible for adjudicating UN
responsibility would satisfy the international requirement under Section
29 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Section 29 requires
that the UN create “appropriate modes of settlement . . . [for d]isputes
involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official
position enjoys immunity . . . .”181 A treaty could also address the
emerging requirement under Section 39 of the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations that members of a
responsible international organization “take, in accordance with the rules
of the organization, all appropriate measures in order to provide the
organization with the means for effectively fulfilling its obligations . . .”
when it is responsible for a violation.182
Precisely how such a treaty would be negotiated raises a number of
interesting questions. Would the treaty be negotiated exclusively by UN
Member States? Would States be able to make reservations regarding
which advisory opinions would be deemed binding? Would those
reservations interfere with the object and purpose of the treaty to provide
uniform judicial resolution to matters involving UN responsibility and
liability? Would the UN be invited to formally confirm the treaty? Could
a failure of the UN to formally confirm the treaty prevent States from
bringing this supplementary treaty into force?
These are matters that would need to be taken under advisement by
the negotiating parties, which may or may not include the UN. What is
certain is that the concept of international organization responsibility, as
articulated in the ILC’s draft articles,183 lacks substance by failing to
articulate a formal judicial review measure. Twenty years ago, former
ICJ Judge Ago asked whether the time has not finally come “to allow
international organizations prosecuting claims against states or resisting
claims by them to take the main road, rather than the byway of an
‘advisory’ procedure artificially given decisive value and binding effect,
which so ill become its intrinsic nature?”184 Unfortunately, Judge Ago’s
request to amend the ICJ Statute, as with previous efforts, has failed to
gain political traction in part, as described earlier,185 because amending
the ICJ Statute is perceived as part of a larger and far more complex
political process of reforming the UN. Yet, there is no reason for the UN
to have special protected legal status within the international legal system
itself.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 23, art. VIII, § 29.
ILC 2009 Report, supra note 16, art. 39.
See supra notes 15–22, 182 and accompanying text.
Ago, supra note 158, at 451.
See supra Part III.A.
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Even if the “more straightforward” process of amending the ICJ
Statute through an amendment of Article 34 is preferable to this article’s
proposed “by-way” process of having a quorum of States, through a
treaty, require the UN to submit disputes over responsibility to the ICJ,
any proposed amendment is likely to fail without a collective agreement
or at least internal momentum to amend the ICJ Statute. As Judges Ago
and Bedjaoui reluctantly seem to admit by acknowledging the legal
mechanism of “binding advisory opinions,” the next best option must be
to rely on the existing mechanisms of the ICJ Statute as triggered by a
supplementary treaty. While perhaps less elegant of a solution when
compared to a simple amendment of the ICJ Statute, this second option
possesses one crucial characteristic that the amendment process lacks: it
is immediately viable for the quorum of States that sign the treaty.
Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that, in efforts to negotiate a treaty to
secure regular advisory jurisdiction over UN contentious matters, States
will muster the political will to make amendments to Article 34 and 36 of
the ICJ Statute. Until then, States are confined to applying the existing
tools within the ICJ Statute, which are sufficient, although not perfect,
for ensuring judicial review of matters involving UN responsibility and
liability under international law.
The proposal for formalizing the mechanism of “binding advisory
opinions” to include a broader array of international actions serves the
dual goals proposed by the International Law Association’s Committee
on Accountability of International Organisations.186 In their draft report,
the Committee called for rules that “will have to keep the balance
between preserving the necessary autonomy in decision-making of
[international organizations] and guarantee that the [international
organizations] will not be able to avoid accountability.”187 A narrowly
drafted treaty focused on facilitating ICJ adjudication of UN
responsibility could do just that.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for international law to maintain its credibility among
Member States, there needs to be continuity and predictability. These
elements must exist in the interpretation of the law of international
responsibility both as it applies to States, as well as to the UN. Currently,
the responsibility of the UN for breaches of international law is
approached on an ad hoc basis. In some instances, the UN has
acknowledged its responsibility and made discretionary damage
payments. In other instances, organizations have been protected by
186. Int’l Law Ass’n, First Report of the Committee on Accountability of
International Organisations, 68 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 584 (1998).
187. Id. at 602.
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privileges and immunities.
When the UN has damaged or caused inadvertent harm to groups or
individuals as a result of their activities, there is a need for judicial
review to ensure that the international law of responsibility is interpreted
consistently and applied uniformly. To create this assurance, one judicial
body should address these rare but important cases. As argued above, the
appropriate body is the International Court of Justice.
This article has reviewed two possibilities for achieving review of
the international legality of UN actions. Numerous ICJ jurists and some
States have called for an enlargement of the number of parties who can
invoke the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. As former ICJ Judge Ago
reflected in his seminal 1991 article, States and the UN have historically
needed to be treated differently since there was great uncertainty about
whether the UN would survive as an institution.188 Times have changed
significantly and as Ago queries, “can this differentiation be justified
now that it has become commonplace for international organizations and
states to be parties, on an equal footing, to disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of bilateral agreements, as well as general
conventions?”189 This article concludes that for purposes of uniform rule
of international law, States and the UN must be treated equally as
primary actors of international law. To the extent that either a State or the
UN fails to comply with international law, the international community
needs to be able to rely on a neutral decision maker to ascertain
responsibility.
Although a revised Article 34, which includes the UN as party to
contentious jurisdiction, is attractive for simplicity, the proposal is
fraught with bigger political issues involving stubborn discussions over
UN institutional reform. While such amendments would have a major
impact on the law of international responsibility, international liability,
and international institutions, these amendments are unlikely to
materialize because they would require commencing a complicated
amendment process.190
A more politically viable option is to accept the ICJ Statute and
Rules as they are and instead provide for a supplementary convention
addressing the issue of UN responsibility. Such an agreement would
specifically require that unless the UN is able to reach an acceptable
settlement within a reasonable time frame, it must submit disputes over
issues of international law to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. This
supplementary treaty would be an important step towards transparently
188. Ago, supra note 158, at 450.
189. Id.
190. The amendment process described in the ICJ Statute is akin to amending the UN
Charter. See supra Part III.A.

2012]

BINDING THE UNITED NATIONS

113

ensuring that the rule of law is available for State parties that cannot
privately resolve their legal grievances with the UN.
The effects of such a convention on access to justice are easy to
envision. In disaster-ridden Haiti, the families of the children who were
mistakenly shot by UN peacekeepers and the families of cholera victims
might receive some solace in knowing that the UN does not operate with
impunity because it has failed to provide a standing claims commission
or grievance process for individuals injured by UN bodies.191 Rather, the
UN, if it is to reflect the rule of law upon which it is founded, must be
held to the same standards of judicial review as States and be held
judicially responsible for those actions and omissions that violate
fundamental public international law. As international law has evolved,
both States and the UN agencies must have a reliable forum to pursue
emerging issues of international responsibility, a forum in which they can
assign accountability. The institutions that the community of nations
created through the UN Charter must not be above or separated from the
rule of law.
The proposals in this paper are an attempt to ensure that States can
have some recourse for adjudicating international organization
responsibility on behalf of their citizens. By calling for judicial review by
the ICJ, this article endeavors to make a contribution to the line of robust
scholarship by ICJ judges and international legal academics seeking to
declare that the UN is not separate from, but equal to, other recognized
international actors. Unlike some international reforms that threaten the
status quo of international interactions, the enlargement of ICJ
jurisdiction is not a threat to States; rather, it is a promise that the UN
will be responsible for complying with the same body of public
international law as States.
While the international community has missed past opportunities to
address UN accountability due to barriers of maintaining political will,
the time is now propitious to evolve the UN System to reflect
international legal realities. The ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility
for International Organizations provide the policy-making momentum for
States to enter a supplementary treaty or amend ICJ Article 34, in order
to ensure that the UN’s actions are grounded in the foundations of
international law. The continued efforts at differentiating UN actions
from trans-boundary State actions are legally disingenuous. As Karel
Wellens has observed, “there is no inherent reason why remedial
outcomes of restitution, damages, specific performance, satisfaction and
injunctive relief, applicable under the regime of state responsibility
should not also become available under the organizational responsibility

191. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
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regime.”192
Our faith in the international system as one that is just and fair
depends on it being capable of responding justly and equitably to crises
and disputes. States have already formally commended the ILC’s Articles
on State Responsibility and are exploring the possibility of a convention
on State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.193 The current
drafting process of the Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations presents an unprecedented opportunity for States to
overcome a half century of inertia. States should use this opportunity to
champion the rule of law for both States and the UN by ensuring that the
ICJ truly serves as “the principal judicial organ”194 for all UN
institutions.

192. Karel Wellens, Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing an
Accountability Regime for International Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in
Closing the Gap, 25 MICH. J. OF INT’L LAW, 1, 21 (2004).
193. G.A. Res. 62/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/61 (Jan. 8, 2008).
194. ICJ Statute, supra note 11, art. 1.

